Source: WAF Journal no.6 1995. pp8-11
The struggle against communalism: defining our positive alternative
by Robini PH
COMMUNALISM has been defined by the historian Bipin Chandra as the 'belief that because a group of people fol-low a particular religion they have, as a result, common social, political and eco-nomic interests.' The term applies not only to rivalry and competition between religious groups but also caste groups within the same religion. It is widely understood all over the Indian suh-conti-nent where it is a part of popular political discourse.
A major problem in discussing com-munalism and trying to define an alterna-tive to it is that virtually all the terms we use such as democracy, secularism, reli-gion and identity are so nebulous that it is often not at all clear what exactly is being advocated. While it is true that an alterna-tive has to be created in practice, it would surely help if we have a better idea of what we are talking about and trying to achieve, since a purely negative movement can never have the same appeal as a positive movement with a clear and attractive goal.
DEMOCRACY
For some people the meaning of democ-racy is very simple: it means majority rule by means of representatives who are elected once every four to six years and are then more or less free to do as they wish. According to this conception if the government elected by the majority then proceeds to discriminate against, perse-cute or even exterminate various minori-ties, this behaviour is not in conflict with the norms of democratic government. Thus this kind of democracy can go along with a fairly authoritarian and repressive state, the violation of fundamental human rights, and the denial of basic civil liber-ties. It is also quite compatible with com-munalism, casteism or racism. if this is what most people understand us, to be advocating when we put forward democracy as an alternative to communalism, they might well say, what's so great about it? We've had it ever since Independence and look at our condition today! Alternatively they might feel that a rabidly communal government is per-fectly democratic provided it comes to power through an election.
Very different is the conception which identifies democracy with the protec-tion of certain basic human and democ-ratic rights such as; the right to life, free-dom from torture and arbitrary deten-tion, freedom of association and expres-sion, the right to unionise and go on strike. In order to qualify as a democra-cy, a state must be able to guarantee these rights to all, irrespective of indi-vidual differences-1 it has to be democra-cy for everyone or it is not democracy at all. Clearly this is still far from being an ideal state of affairs. There is no guaran-tee, for example, that everyone will receive basic necessities such as food, clothing, shelter, health care and educa-tion; democracy of this sort does not rule out dire poverty and deprivation. What it does do, however, is provide the conditions in which people can organ-ise and take collective action to obtain these necessities for themselves; it enables them to live with dignity. And on the other side, it limits the power which some people have over the lives of others, the power to deny others the rights and liberties which they can claim for themselves.
This kind of democracy, which includes women's, children's, workers and minority rights, trade union rights as well as the right to choose your own marriage partner, hardly exists on a mass scale in India today except as a dream; it is incompatible with commu-nalism, casteism or racism, the whole rationale of which is to endow people of one group with rights and privileges denied to oth-ers. If democracy is to be a positive value counterposed to communalism, we have to make it clear that it is this kind of democracy we are arguing for and not the other. And this meaning of democracy is inseparable from secularism.
SECULARISM AND THE SECULAR STATE
It is a common misconception that secu-larism implies the total absence of reli-gion; however, secularism need not mean the absence of religion as such but the absence of discrimination on the basis of religion.
Within this broad definition there are (at least) three possible variants: (1) the state can remain completely separate from religion; (2) it can intervene in reli-gious practices only where it becomes necessary to protect fundamental human and democratic rights; (3) it can intervene impartially in all religions, ostensibly in order to bring about reli-gious and social reform.
A secular state in the first sense would not be very practicable, nor would it be desirable; it would mean, for example, that the state would not be able to intervene to prevent practices such as human sacrifice, so long as it is claimed that these are undertaken for religious reasons. A democratic state implies freedom of religious belief, but religious practices should be restricted to those which do not violate the human rights and civil liberties of any individ-ual; in this sense, religious rights are subsidiary to fundamental human and democratic rights.
India corresponds most closely to the third model, at least in theory. However, its intervention in the affairs of minority religions can hardly be said to about reform. The most well-known case is perhaps that of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which takes away from Muslim women the right to receive maintenance from an ex- husband for more than three months. The bill was demanded by the most vocal section of the Muslim community but was bitterly opposed by others, who felt that it deprived Muslim women of the rights accord-ed to them by the Quran, and was obnoxious to Islamic principles; its enshrinement in law not only made religious reform more difficult, but represented a set-back in the achievement of more egalitarian gender relations between Muslim women and men. Similarly Christian women campaigning for the reform of Christian family law to allow for divorce in cases of a husband's per-sistent neglect, cruelty, adultery or desertion felt that the state's recogni-tion of only the Christian hierarchy as representatives of the Community was an obstacle to their own cam-paign for reform. In the case of Hinduism, affirmative action in the interest of scheduled castes and tribes (dalits) has been aimed at purging Hinduism of the evil of untouchability; but the denial of these benefits to the dalits who have a non-Hindu religious affiliation constitutes discrimination against them on the basis of religion alone, and penalises those who choose this method of affirming their dignity.
As these examples show, the inter-ventionist interpretation of secular-ism, by requiring the state to inter-vene on matters of religious doc-trine, compromises the secular char-acter of the state; it can come to play a role similar to that of a theocracy, which violates the religious freedom even of those whose religion it claims to represent by imposing on all believers the interpretation of only one section.
Both the first and third senses of the secular state indicate that while a secular state may be a necessary condition for democracy (because it rules out perse-cution of religious minorities and dissidents), it is by no means a sufficient condition. A secular state could, for example, discriminate against all women regardless of their religious affiliation, or it could vio-late the human and democratic rights of all critics without discriminating between them on the basis of religion. In other words, while a communal state is necessarily undemocratic, it doesn't follow that a sec-ular state is necessarily democratic. From this point of view, the second definition of a secular state is the most satisfactory, to the extent that it implies a com-mitment to the protection of human rights and civil liberties. When arguing for secularism we have to make it clear that it is this essentially ethical, human-ist notion of secularism that we mean; a meaning which links it to the positive meaning of democracy identified earlier otherwise we could easily be mis-taken to be advocates of models which are unap-pealing if not outright repellent.
RELIGION
To some people, religion means spirituality. The dimension inherent in every human being which makes life of infinite value and implies that human needs - and therefore rights - are not simply physi-cal, material ones. Recognition of the common uni-versal spirit means desiring for all human beings the respect and consideration one desires for oneself. This meaning can reinforce and amplify the ethical humanist interpretation of secularism and democra-cy.
But religion is not just about spirituality; indeed for many people - both those who practice religion and those who do not- religion is a hierarchical, authoritarian, male-dominated institution, which divides rather than unites those who practice it by inculcating a sense of difference from and superiori-ty to anyone outside a particular religious communi-ty. Religion in this sense is the breeding ground of communalism.
In India, communalists have counterposed indigenous spirituality to Western materialism in order to justify their retrograde politics and the argu-ment has sold because it has superficial plausibility. But communalism is about power: nothing could be less spiritual or more materialistic. The resurgence of religious communalism today, at a time of rapid social change and capitalist expansion, plays more than one role. Apart from the leadership, who see it as a convenient means of capturing state power (or power within their communities), wide strata of the population suffer a deep sense of insecurity as 'all that is solid melts into air', and they are only too willing to cling to the illusory material security promised by returning to a mythical past. For others, communalism offers a means of getting ahead in an increas-ingly competitive environment, offering them every-thing from employment to school places for their children to physical elimination of their business rivals. Finally, for the foot soldiers of organisations like the Bajrang Dal and Shiva Sena, the sense of power derived from the ability to kill, rape, loot and burn with impunity must be quite irresistible.
These are all the sordid materialistic reasons for turning to 'religion', and paradoxically it is we who appeal to the more ethical, spiritual principle of seek-ing one's own well-being in solidarity with others, in establishing mutually caring relationships with others rather than competitive and destructive ones. Thus religious communalism, far from being evidence of deep spirituality, is shameful proof of the complete and utter spiritual impoverishment of those who practise; it, and their determination to destroy the spiritual element in our culture. Religious communal-ism is incompatible with genuine spirituality confusion due to the use of the same word -religion- for both should not be allowed to obscure the fact that they are poles apart.
On the other hand, the same confusion has led some secularists to reject spirituality in their attempt to combat what they see as the purely retrograde phenomenon of religion, and this has contributed to the growth of authoritarian and repressive secularism at the expense of the ethical and humanist variety. In their obsession with political power, secular authori-tarianism and religious communalism have much in common; a notion of human Tights is alien to both.
NATIONALISM
For many people, the alternative is a national identi-ty based on shared citizenship. Such an identity would, it is argued, cut across religious, ethnic and linguistic differences and unite people on the basis of a common nation.
In India, while minority communalism can easily be denounced as being 'anti-national', majority com-munalism -which in fact is far more destructive- can always pose as nationalism. But even if it were pos-sible to build up a genuinely non-communal nation-al identity, would it be desirable? A national identity suffers from similar drawbacks to a communal one. It excludes people who are seen as aliens on one's own soil, and is therefore compatible with the persecution of refugees, migrant workers, and other foreign nationals (such as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in India). A strong sense of national identity, even if it is not linked to religion or ethnicity, is quite compatible with national aggression, imperialism and genocide; and even people who do not participate actively in such behaviour may passively consent to it because of the indifference to injustices perpetrated against 'foreigners' and 'aliens'.
In fact, the drawbacks associated with commu-nalism can be traced to all forms of identification unless our primary identification is based on our shared humanity. At first sight this seems like a very abstract and general identity, but it is actually very concrete. It means in any situation of oppression, we identify with those whose humanity is being violated in one way or another. We might identify with a male worker against an oppressive employer but with his wife against him if he abuses her at home; with a woman from a minority community against commu-nalists or racists who are persecuting her, but with her child or servant if she ill-treats them; with Our fel-low citizens against a foreign aggressor if our Country is being invaded or colonised, but with the foreigner against our own nation-state if it is pursuing a policy of persecution or aggression against foreign nation-als. This kind of identity is neither simple nor straightforward, because it involves identifying with different people at different times, and thinking about each situation; whereas with a communal or national identity, you can simply and unthinkingly identify with the same people all the time, no matter what they happen to be doing.
CONCLUSION
If we want to be effective in our struggle against com-munalism, we have to make it very clear what we mean when we use terms such as secularism, democ-racy, nationalism and even religion. This is not a mat-ter of being pedantic about definitions, but of being clear what we are trying to achieve in practice. We already suffer a serious disadvantage vis a vis the far right, since they appeal to sentiments which are fos-tered on a mass scale by the deeply authoritarian character of present society, whereas mass prolifera-tion of the secular, democratic, humanism to which we appeal would require nothing less than a cultural revolution: a movement to eradicate patriarchal fam-ily relationships, encourage students to be critical and think for themselves rather than unquestioningly accepting their teachers' authority, build trade unions which are free of crippling dependence on 'leaders', introduce industrial democracy whereby workers have information and consultation rights in the run-ning of their workplaces as well as genuine local democracy whereby residents have some control over the administration of their neighbourhood. All the more reason, therefore, why our vision needs to be clear, and our articulation Of it unambiguous.
Creating a movement which puts forward a posi-tive alternative to communalism also implies a radical critique of most of the existing progressive movements. They were paralysed when confronted with the communal violence of December 1992 and January 1993, in the aftermath of the tearing down of Babri Masjid in Ayodhya by a coalition of the Hindu right. Their sectional character was underlined; thus the trade union movement stands compromised as being seriously contaminated with communal ele-ments, the feminist movement has raised slogans amenable to a communal interpretation, and even (oppressed groups) have not proved immune to the false promises of the Hindu Rashtra (a Hindu state). On the other hand, the anti-communal secular move-ment suffers from the same kind of narrowness; it can never become a mass movement while it remains indifferent to class, caste and gender oppression, and in some cases even allows its members to engage in such practices. Unless this particularism is transcend-ed, each group can say with some justification, 'Why should we support your struggle if you care nothing about ours?' The alternative is not that each individ-ual has to participate in every struggle, but rather that the movement must be one which transcends partic-ular interests.
Secondly, internal relationships within this move-ment too have to he radically different from what we find in most movements today. If these relationships are hierarchical, authoritarian or sectarian, the attrac-tive power of the movement will be greatly dimin-ished; the ability to debate differences creatively while working together on the basis of shared princi-ples is crucial. in a sense, the movement itself has to prefigure the kind of society we are advocating; unless we function in a truly democratic manner and maintain mutually caring relationships, we cannot attract people desperately seeking the security of belonging to a community. To this extent, means and ends are inseparable.
It's possible that in the short term something which falls short of a movement of this type can push back the advancing communal forces; but the threat of their resurgence will continue to hang over us until we rise above the narrow sectional interests and cre-ate a radical democratic, ethical, secular, humanist movement which is opposed to all forms of oppres-sion and authoritarianism.
Rohini lives in Bombay and is the author of To Do Something Beautiful, Sheba, London, 1990.
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